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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: The study aimed at analyzing the pragmatic approaches of Saudi-Iranian relations and their 
impact on the Yemeni crisis (2011-2019). 
Methodology: The study uses a combination of the used decision-making approach and the international system 
approach. 
Main Findings: Saudi-Iranian relations were sometimes pragmatic because they were based on each country’s 
fulfillment of its national interests. This did not change the Saudi and Iranian strategy nor did it lead to loosening US 
domination over the Gulf region. 
Applications of this study: This research can be used for academic purposes for universities, lecturers of political 
science, researchers, and undergraduate and postgraduate students. Also, it can be used for policy purposes for the 
decision-makers and politicians. 
Novelty/Originality of this study: The phenomenon that existed in Saudi-Iranian relationships and referring to various 
previous research results, the study regarding the Saudi-Iranian relationship was conducted and presented 
comprehensively and completely. It is necessary to take into account this topic that can explore the Saudi-Iranian 
relationship and determine the extent to which topic can contribute to political science researches. 
Keywords: Pragmatism, Foreign Policy, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen Crisis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Iran reappeared in the Arab political scene following the US 2003 invasion of Iraq. This was associated with the growing 
Arab (particularly the Gulf) concern of the Iranian political, security, and economic impact on the Iraqi political scene. 
This appearance was undoubtedly preceded by a presence in the Lebanese political scene as well as building a strategic 
relationship with Saudi Arabia. A clear and deep understanding of the Iranian presence nature in the Arab political scene 
and its development requires research and consideration noting that the Iranian presence counts on the utilization of 
circumstances formed through different situations and variables and other players rather than Iran alone. Those variants 
ranged from monitoring and observation to averting the Saudi threat directed to Iran as a beginning, and improving 
relations, containment, and openness to weakening and forcing Iran to accept reconciliation and negotiation to remove 
the causes of tension in the region. Although Iranian intervention was evident in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, the fall of 
Sana'a to the Houthi Movement marked the climax of Iranian expansion over the Arabian Peninsula when Saudi Arabia 
realized the gravity of the situation and began to understand that Iran's role was threatening its role in the Middle East.  
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia began a military campaign in Yemen to prevent the Houthis allied with Iran from seizing 
power. Riyadh accused Tehran of using Houthi militants to carry out a military coup. While Saudi Arabia was helping 
and fighting al-Qaida, Iran was expanding spheres of influence around Saudi Arabia and its northern, eastern and 
southern borders, forcing Saudi Arabia, in the period 2017-2019, to change its strategy of supporting allies to direct 
intervention against Iran, by initiating the Operation Decisive Storm. In another context, Saudi Arabia competed with 
Iran in Iraq, which is a theatre for Iran in providing the latter's needs of electricity, oil derivatives, agricultural 
commodities, and raw materials. Saudi Arabia sought to achieve its objectives in Iraq through four tactical paths namely: 
interference with the Shiite political elite, strengthening Saudi-Iraqi relations, religious engagement with these 
communities, and spreading social goodwill (Clausen, 2015). 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Adel (2011) studied how the political decision is made in Iran, the role of political forces and institutions in the Iranian 
political system, and studying the Iranian political system as an actual model of the Twelver Shiite thought for the first 
time in modern times. This study also shows the scope of Arab-Iranian relations development and their impact on Arab 
national security and averting and differences in those relations. 
Rajayiy (2012) addressed Iran’s role in the Middle East and its attempts to provoke sectarian conflict in the region 
through the sectarian groups loyal to it. The study also discusses Arab-Iranian relations, Iranian strategy in the region, 
the religious belief adopted by Iran and its attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries, especially Syria 
and Iraq. It also shows the sectarian dimension of this intervention as well as Iran's quest to spread its revolution over 
neighbouring countries. Jibril (2015) demonstrated the political decision-making in Saudi foreign policy because of its 
strategic and vital position in the region and the world as well as the regional and international role of Saudi Arabia in 
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light of the challenges facing the region and Saudi Arabia in particular. Researchers have used the systems analysis 
approach and decision-making approach to reach the common objectives of the study. The study concluded that Iran’s 
attempt to dictate itself on the agenda of the region countries harms relations with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi 
Arabia. 
Nawfal (2016) clarified the nature of the Yemeni and Syrian crises, the direct Iranian interference in both countries, the 
Saudi-Iranian relationship, and their position towards those crises that affected these relations negatively. In the context 
of the Yemeni crisis, researchers have addressed crisis background, manifestations, risks, and positions of all parties, 
especially Saudi Arabia. This study concluded that the Yemeni crisis has affected countries of the region, particularly the 
Arabian Gulf in terms of politics, demographics, society, and economics. Study of Hasan (2019) found the various risks 
and threats, and impact on Saudi Arabia and the United States of America and as well as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, this 
study illustrates the relations between Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, which are affected by regional and geographical 
conditions, security challenges, demographic ties, and common interests and the role of both Turkey and Pakistan in 
solving the pivotal and regional problems of Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
METHODOLOGY 
To address the Saudi and Iranian roles and their relationship to the Yemeni crisis, from a research point of view, and the 
role of both countries towards it in light of regional and international circumstances, patterns and dimensions in the 
region, the following approaches will be adopted to study the political phenomenon, and analyze international relations 
concerning the Saudi and Iranian countries. The approaches are: 
Decision-making approach: it focuses on the external political decision-making process as a basis for an interpretation of 
international relations and foreign policy of each country. It comprises the human and inhuman environment, country 
area and resources, geographical location, value system, homogeneity between population, public cultures, national 
identity, beliefs, feelings, the behaviour of society, and external environment (Al-Hamdani, 2004). The components of 
the decision-making approach are divided into the internal environment, human and inhuman environment, society, 
country area and resources, geographical location, value system, homogeneity between population, public cultures, 
national identity, beliefs, feelings, and behaviour of society. The external environment includes factors such as indirect 
actions and reactions of other countries, geographical environment, states, societies, cultures, races, economic factors, 
trends of the value system in society, and the decision-making process. It also comprises a flow of clear and accurate 
information to decision-makers, roles, and goals (Al-Khawaldeh, 2014). This approach can be utilized in explaining 
some external phenomena that concern Saudi-Iranian relations and determines the position of decision-makers in both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran towards the Yemeni crisis and the scope of the impact made by both the internal and external 
environment in Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
International relations system approach: the study relies primarily on testing its hypothesis based on an international 
system analysis approach that draws upon a central concept i.e. the system as the main unit of analysis. We can define 
the system as a set of elements that are functionally linked regularly including reciprocal interaction and independence 
and thus the political system becomes a state of communication between parts (Al-Menoufi, 1987). Components of this 
approach are the external relations of countries rely upon the systematic explanation of external behaviour. In other 
words, the external relations of any country should be addressed as a mobile system runs through an interaction between 
a set of functional parts toward a state of interdependence. This system accomplishes a basic system of external political 
relations represented in making and implementing external decisions to achieve the goals it aspires to. The foreign policy 
system runs within a framework of a composite environment, including internal and external parts embodying the overall 
surrounding conditions (Easton, 1977). 
The researcher tries to benefit from the systems approach concerning the internal and external environmental study of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran and the impact of that environment on the Yemeni crisis. In his context, environment refers to the 
internal, regional and international environment, which can be considered as inputs that formed the system environment, 
and extent of the system’s response to this environment and outputs enabling the decision-maker to utilize advantages 
and avoid disadvantages. 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Saudi-Iranian Relations 1979-2019 
Since 1998, the Iranian-Gulf relations have witnessed a remarkable advance at all levels, most notably the improvement 
of Iranian-Saudi relations, which resulted in the conclusion of economic and security agreements as well as the 
significant improvement in Bahraini-Iranian relations that ended an era of suspicion and doubt between the two countries 
such as the case with other Gulf countries. 
Saudi-Iranian relations have been characterized by political, ethnic, and sectarian differences throughout history. In the 
period leading up to the so-called Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, Saudi Arabia's relations with Iran were sometimes 
tense and cold. In 1943, relations between the two countries were severed when Saudi authorities executed an Iranian 
pilgrim after accusing him of throwing dirt on the Kaaba and insulting the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his 
companions. Saudi-Iranian relations were restored in 1946 but quickly suffered tension when the Shah's regime 
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recognized Israel in 1950. In general, the Saudi-Iranian relation before the Iranian revolution was tense. However, in the 
period from 1957-1967, Iran converged with Saudi Arabia against Egypt in its war in Yemen. 
Nevertheless, Saudi-Iranian relations were soon strained by Iran's intention to annex Bahrain after Britain withdrew its 
troops, as Saudi Arabia supported Bahrain's independence in 1971 after a UN referendum in Bahrain (Commins, 2010). 
The Islamic Summit Conference held in Tehran, the Iranian capital, in December 1997, was a turning point for a new 
chapter in Iran's relations with Islamic countries. One of Iran’s main objectives of this conference was to create an 
atmosphere of trust in its relations with the Islamic world, especially the neighbouring countries in the Gulf region. The 
Saudi government also welcomed the policy of de-escalation. It was a great opportunity for the rapprochement of both 
countries and new steps were taken to enhance the political, economic, and cultural relations between the two countries. 
The participation of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, who was then crown prince, in the summit, represented a new chapter 
of relations between the two countries. The visit of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chairman of Expediency 
Discernment Council, to Saudi Arabia from February 21 to March 6, 1998, also had a clear impact on strengthening 
relations between both countries.  
During the visit, areas of cooperation in trade and economic fields were discussed. It was followed by a visit by the 
Saudi foreign minister to Tehran in 1998 when the two foreign ministers signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement 
(Ditto, 2013). To illustrate the pragmatic nature of Saudi-Iranian relations following the success of the Islamic revolution 
in Iran, it is necessary to examine the origins of both parties’ foreign policy. These represent the basis of the dispute, 
bitterness, future competition, or supposed cooperation of the two countries. It is noted that several matters formed 
starting points, stages, and objectives for the Iranian foreign policy, especially in the early years of the Iranian 
revolution, including (Ditto, 2013): 
1. Striving for the establishment of a global Islamic government. 
 
2. Resistance, refusal of surrender, and domination. 
 
3. Defend the vulnerable and liberation movements. 
Spread and advocate Islam, especially the School Ahl al-Bayt "People of the House". Moreover, Imam Khomeini has 
continuously stressed the matter of establishing a united Islamic nation. Saudi Arabia has pursued the following foreign 
policy objectives to achieve its national interests: Focusing on its leading role concerning the policy of the Islamic world, 
particularly the Arab countries. Seeking a united Islamic and Arab world and obtaining the Arab world support to 
maintain its interests. 
1. The effort to spread and advocate the Sunni doctrine. 
 
2. Counter spread of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and maintain the status quo. 
 
3. Containment of extremism in the region and the Islamic world (Al-Hamad, 2016). 
Accordingly, after 1979, Saudi-Iranian relations can be divided into several stages: 
Stage I: 1979-1982 
This period was characterized by monitoring the situation in Iran without expressing its views. Saudi Arabia adopted a 
negative position towards Iran since the Islamic revolution, as Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries planned to ward 
off the Iranian threat, which led Saudi Arabia to implement a policy of patience and pause. During this period, the Saudi-
Iranian relation has been complicated and complex. Competition between the two countries over the gulf and some Arab 
countries was the focal point. The success of the Iranian revolution in 1979 marked a turning point, which in turn 
imposed consecutive changes in the relationship between Tehran and Riyadh. Those influenced the change of the 
internal and external conditions of the two countries resulting in a direct impact on the relations.  
The complex development and change in regional, Arab, and international situations enhanced those changes. Although 
these objectives were pursued by Iran and Saudi Arabia at this stage, the relationship was marred by competition and 
contradiction in the eighties of the last century. On one hand, Saudi Arabia adopted a policy of maintaining the status 
quo and confronting every new power or authority in the region and could not normalize its relations with the Iranian 
revolution due to its eagerness to change the status quo in the region. On the other hand, Iran has employed a policy of 
mass media attack on Saudi Arabia affected by its revolutionary nature and tended to implement its plan to spread its 
revolutionary ideas in Saudi Arabia and all countries in the region.  
It was noted that Saudi Arabia lacked a tangible policy towards Iran, as its stated policy was unclear. Saudi officials 
refrained from expressing their clear views on the Iranian revolution and focused on investigating the controversial 
issues of Iran. Meanwhile, they sought to put obstacles in front of the Iranian revolution to prevent exporting its ideas to 
other Arab countries (Asadi, 2002). Hence, it can be said that the Iranian Revolution and the Gulf War were among the 
most important variables that escalated tension between the two countries at this stage. 
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Stage II: 1982-1986 
Saudi Arabia adopted a political duality policy, as it combined a policy of attack with diplomatic relations. Saudi Arabia 
aimed at drawing the attention of Iranian officials so it allowed Iranian pilgrims to perform a pilgrimage, thus improving 
the dual relations. 
It also supported the mediation committees to end the Iraqi-Iranian war to establish security in the region. Meanwhile, 
the Saudi government ordered Saudi security forces to engage with Iranian pilgrims, provided financial, political, 
military, and security assistance to the Iraqi regime during the war, arguing that the region's balance and security depend 
on Iran's loss (Al-Hamad, 2016). We also note that the Saudi intentions towards Iran were motivated by the Shah’s fall 
in 1979, which served as a US strategic base for implementing its policies and plans in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia 
sought to play this role thereafter in return for curbing Iranian expansion and influence in the region due to its fear of the 
Iranian revolution spread and domination over countries of the region and expanding its influence. The feared situation 
was accomplished later when Iran could control the capitals of four Arab countries namely Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and 
Syria. 
Stage III: 1986-1989 
At this stage, Saudi Arabia failed to confront and force Iran to accept reconciliation and negotiation, and declared its 
hostility towards Iran. In terms of politics, Saudi Arabia gradually sought to weaken the Iranian revolution to contain it 
and suppress it to accept negotiations and reconciliation. Saudi Arabia was heavily encouraged by its military capability 
and the presence of the US and foreign naval fleets in the region (Kazemi, 2001). In April 1989, successive events led to 
the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This resulted in increased attention and prioritized the 
military dimension in the process of strategic planning for both countries due to its importance in achieving the desired 
balance. It was a manifestation of the repercussions of the regional and international environments and has been 
continuously an area of interaction. 
Stage IV: 1990-2019 
During this stage, Saudi-Iranian relations have been cold despite Saudi reservations about Iran’s assistance to Iraqi 
opponents in the Shaabaniya uprising in Iraq that occurred in March 1991. No doubt that circumstance has created and 
contributed to a policy of openness at the level of Iranian foreign policy and thus Iranian presidency focus on the 
principle of de-tension in Iranian foreign relations. Therefore, circumstances on the regional and international arenas 
such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the following wars, curbing Iraq's strategic role after the war, and removing 
Iraq as a regional power, led to a political vacuum. In such circumstances, Iran proceeded to persuade the Gulf Arab 
states to accept it as a strategic partner and fill the vacuum created by Iraq. 
Thus, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Riyadh became more inclined to the idea of Western contribution to Gulf 
security. It ended the policy of security alliance with great powers. To achieve such purpose, Saudi Arabia managed to 
store large quantities of Western weapons in its territory and intensified military-security cooperation with Washington 
utilizing training and conducting joint military exercises, as well as granting the United States some facilities in its 
military airports, with no objection to the security arrangements made by some GCC countries with some great powers 
(Saleem, 1994). 
During the reign of Iranian President Mohammad Hashemi in the mid-1990s, the situation was covered with a change of 
policies, especially after the meeting between him and the then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz in 
Islamabad in 1997. This was a positive turning point in bilateral relations. Saudi Arabia announced its cooperation and 
agreement to hold the 8th summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Tehran, opening a new chapter in 
bilateral relations. The meeting between President Khatami and King Fahd in 1999 also testified to the creation of a 
more favourable atmosphere for the bilateral relations. King Fahd believed that their relationship was at its best and 
highest status. When analyzing the Saudi-Iranian relations during the period of Iranian President Hashemi Fenjani and 
then Mohammad Khatami, we find that both sought to open and establish new relations based on good neighbourliness 
and cooperation, especially in the reign of Khatami, who adopted the approach of this new relationship based on the idea 
of a dialogue of civilizations, religions, and peoples and thus openness to the world, especially the Arab world and its 
geographical neighbours. 
Accordingly and as noted, the Saudi-Iranian relations witnessed further openness, development, and cooperation, which 
has been translated into many mutual visits by officials from both countries at the highest levels. This relationship was 
culminated in concluding a security agreement in 2001, during the visit of the then Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef 
bin Abdulaziz to Iran, which constituted, in its essence, the highest visit of a Saudi official to Iran after decades of 
estrangement. The pilgrimage seasons marked difficult junctures for the Iranian-Saudi relation, which played a major 
role in straining and intensifying that relationship, even in the best conditions of relations between the two countries. 
However, that good relation changed quickly and tuned to be a fierce competition after Gulf War III 2003 (Asadi, 2002). 
This conversion started with Saudi Arabia’s position to counter the Iranian role in the Arabian Gulf in particular and the 
Arab region in general. Riyadh has moved in public to reshape the map of conflicts in the region, after the emergence of 
pro-Iranian Shiite parties in Iraq and control over all the parts of the country and thus the expansion of Iranian influence 
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in the region. Saudi concern increased when the conservative Ahmadinejad rose to power in Iran and his intentions to 
develop Iran’s nuclear program. Regarding the nuclear program of Iran, Saudi Arabia did not hide its fears despite the 
Iranian reassurance that this program is peaceful. Saudi Arabia also warned Iran that everyone will pay for it. It also 
confirmed that although it does not mind, as a major country in the region, obtaining a peaceful nuclear program by Iran, 
it has many declared and undeclared fears that this program will shift to military use and thus the emergence of a new 
nuclear power in the region (Al-Khobar, 2019). 
In this way, Saudi-Iranian relations were staggering between openness, estrangement and tension, which culminated in 
Operation Decisive Hazem Storm in 2015, in which Saudi Arabia led an Arab alliance including the UAE and many 
Arab countries, albeit symbolically, against the Houthi movement in Yemen and for supporting political legitimacy. The 
Houthis obtained control of all organs of Yemini state and successively launched a coup against Yemeni President 
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi; the consequences of which still have repercussions on every country in the region and 
concerning that crisis. To further complicate the crisis in Saudi-Iranian relations, on January 2, 2016, Saudi Arabia 
executed Shiite Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr and 46 other Sunnis on terrorism and incitement charges (Melhem, 2016). Many 
demonstrations occurred in Iran to condemn the execution and consider as an attack on Iran. As a result, Iranian 
demonstrators burned the Saudi embassy in the Iranian capital, smashed its facades, and attacked its employees, removed 
the flag, and stole its properties. In another demonstration, protestors attacked the Saudi consulate in Mashhad. 
As a result, Saudi Arabia severed all relations with Iran, followed by many Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, we believe 
that the Saudi-Iranian relations have been governed at this time by many difficult security and political issues, although 
the official speech of both sides focused on general cooperation and convergence matters for the interests of the region 
and the Islamic world. 
Role of Some Arab Crises In Saudi - Iranian Relations 
In this section, the researcher reviews two important crises: the Syrian crisis and the Iraqi crisis; 
The Syrian Crisis 
Regarding the Syrian crisis as a model for the Iranian foreign policy under President Rouhani, the objective analysis of 
such a topic is possible according to geopolitical vision and perceptions. The Syrian-Iranian alliance was fundamental, 
although Saudi Arabia considered it an anti-sectarian hostile alliance based on regional visions, perceptions, and interests 
against Saudi interests in the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabia related such alliance as intellectual and ideological 
capabilities and constants, exposing the region to political shocks due to the extent of that relationship and Iran's 
participation in the Russian-Iranian war in cooperation with the Syrian regime against the Syrian people. 
Iran believes that the nature of the political relations in which Syria works as the main means to support the Islamic 
resistance and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine. Thus, it is difficult to imagine that there can be a change 
like this relationship (between Iran and Syria) (Wakim, 2011). 
In many situations, Iran has also stressed its support for the ballot boxes in Syria to solve the Syrian crisis, but Saudi 
Arabia firmly believes that Iran interferes in organs of the Syrian state even in the elections. Moreover, Iran will not be 
satisfied that another regime governs Syria other than the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on one hand. It 
becomes clear that Iran believes on the other hand that there is no solution in Syria away from the Iranian factor, as 
evidenced by the Geneva Conference on Syria, which ruled out Iran's participation based on the desire of the US and 
Saudi Arabia, which was affirmed at the end of the conference. What happened later has revealed how serious the 
decision-maker is Iran emphasized and maintained the Iranian-Syrian alliance. 
The constant in politics is changing (neither friend nor enemy is permanent) in the context of political actions in the 
world. However, Iran wanted to prove to the world through its foreign policy, especially in the Syrian crisis, that it 
would not compromise its relations with a friend. Moreover, the Iranian decision-maker always thinks of maintaining 
and upgrading such a relation to a strategic alliance. Unlike other countries, including the United States, it will not trade 
their interests for an Iranian alliance with Syria. 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad explained the same in many situations that the Syrian-Iranian relations are not subject 
to settlement in the south or the north, nor do they subject to international temptations and one-upmanship. Such a 
relationship shall not be subject to impact in the international bazaar. During the Arab Spring 2011-2019, Saudi Arabia 
has tried to lure the Syrian regime to leave such alliance through many fields. However, it seems that the link between 
Iran and Syria was greater than all the Saudi temptations, which strengthened the regional position of Iran even in talks 
on its nuclear program as well Trump administration's attempts to sit for negotiations with Iran to reach a solution 
regarding US sanctions on Iran over its nuclear file. 
The Iraqi Crisis 
In the case of Iraq, the situation is quite different. Saudi Arabia's strategic objectives and interests have agreed to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime since the early 1990s despite being the world's largest supporter of President 
Saddam Hussein's war with Iran from 1981-1988, Gulf War I, to prevent Iran's expansion into the region. 
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No doubt that both Iraq and Iran are pivotal countries in the Middle East. The nature of the relationship between them 
determines the shape of the entire region. Despite their common interests, the Iranian-Iraqi relation was not correlated, 
especially after the overthrow of former President Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. 
Such a relationship has witnessed instability at times against some problems at other times due to the geographical 
overlap between the two countries. Thus, political events and changes have shown that Iraq’s emergence as a sound, 
strategic, and integral power in the region is in the interest of Iraq and the region (Iran in particular). If Iraq is a 
fragmented and separated country, the Iraqi and regional parts will be subject to political shocks and downfalls, as 
believed by the Iranian viewpoint. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is contrary to the Iranian viewpoint. It believes that the 
emergence of Iraq as a strategic power in the region will rid the region of Iran's sectarian, political, and military 
ambitions, and a weak Iraq will serve Iran's strategic interests. As proof of this, Iran was one of the first regional 
countries to declare its support for the Iraqi people after the fall of the regime of former President Saddam Hussein in 
2003 and even cooperated to some extent with the United States to achieve that goal. After 2003, Iraq worked hard to 
activate its political and economic relationship with Iran, where coordination between Iran and Iraq on some regional 
issues has led to concluding several agreements and memoranda of cooperation. 
Since 2003, the Iraqi approach has changed as Iraq, which became backed and supported by the United States and Iran, 
has been eager to move away from problems even in the most difficult circumstances. The new regime began to reject 
the existence of the People's Mujahedin of Iran, which opposes the Iranian regime. Saudi Arabia has refused to exclude 
this organization from Iraq, which was hosted by former president Saddam Hussein. 
On one hand, Iran, as some analysts believe, has become open to the new political system in Iraq. Those relations have 
continued despite the objection of Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf countries to some aspects, especially concerning 
the incomprehensible position of Iraq towards Iran's position on the Yemeni and Syrian crises. On the other hand, the 
new Iraqi regime, after 2003, played a major role in bringing the Western-Iranian views closer leading to Iran+5+1 
Negotiations in Baghdad. 
Alternatively, President Rouhani considers that the Iranian-Iraqi relationship is strategic, calling for cooperation, on 
many occasions, between Iran and Iraq to achieve the interests of both the Iranian and Iraqi peoples, and removing the 
effects of previous hostile actions under former president Saddam Hussein. He also called for the development of 
economic relations and infrastructure between the two countries (Pound & Jack, 2004). Therefore, it is expected that 
Iran's policy with Iraq will not change, especially with the events of Mosul in June 2014. Iran has provided assistance in 
all its forms to support Iraq in its war with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant “ISIS”. 
In this framework, the Iraqi political system stressed the need for Iran’s participation in the international counter-
terrorism coalition, and its insistence on making Iran a member in such coalition(Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2015)., 
Although the United States considered Iran an advocate of terrorism and even an axis of the evil country. In politics, no 
variable is constant. It is no secret that the field rhetoric, developments, and movements of both countries in all respects, 
especially diplomacy, and under the guidance and action of active countries in the world, led by the United States, may 
foreshadow a broad confrontation, probably a military, which will have a disastrous role on the entire region and will 
have unpredictable results. 
Iranian Presence in the Arab Mashriq and Its Impact on Saudi Foreign Policy 2003-2019 
Under President Hassan Rouhani, Iran has adopted a balanced approach towards the Gulf States. Before winning the 
2013 elections, he declared that he is keen to turn the "animosity" with Saudi Arabia into mutual respect, pointing out 
that Iran aspires to have good official relations with all countries neighbouring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. It 
was noted that Rouhani positively dealt with key regional issues such as homeland security and Gulf security, which 
later turned out to be an old friend of Saudi Arabia due to his positive role in many security files and coordination with 
Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s. However, the Arab Gulf states have expressed increasing concern as a result of the 
Iranian-American rapprochement during the era of US President Obama. Moreover, some Arab-Iranian relations were 
characterized were not good nor bad in full based on their relations and interests. These relations relied on the strategic 
situation, especially their approach towards Syria, as noted above, the relation with Lebanon, Jordan, Oman, Algeria, and 
other countries on one hand, and the cold or tense relation with Saudi Arabia on some occasions on the other hand. 
Iranian Presence in the Arab Region 
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stressed that Iran is determined to build best relations with Islamic countries, Saudi 
Arabia has a special position in Iranian politics, and it is possible to establish good and developed relations between the 
two countries, as Saudi officials have a positive view towards the current government in Iran (Ditto, 2013). It was also 
noted that Iran has returned strongly to the Arab political scene after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Such return was 
linked to the concern of the Gulf and Arab countries of the Iranian political, security, and economic presence in the 
Lebanese scene without repeating this presence in the Iraqi scene, as well as building a strategic relationship with Syria. 
There was a clear and profound understanding of the evolved and serious Iranian presence in the Arab political scene. 
Therefore, the following facts should be carefully addressed: 
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1. The Iranian political presence is based on investing in conditions formed through different variables and other 
players rather than Iran. The presence in Lebanon relied on international recognition of sectarian diversity and scope 
as well as a presence in Iraq. 
 
2. The Iranian presence in the Arab political scene varies according to geopolitics or scope of closeness concerning the 
Iranian political situation in Iraq. This is different for Iran and its Arab neighbours concerning influence in Syria, 
which is not a neighbouring country of Iran. 
 
3. The time frame of political events and variables is a decisive factor in understanding the Iranian political presence in 
the Arab political scene. The Iranian presence in 2003, 2011, or 2019 is different. Before 2003, the Arab position 
towards Iran was divided. Most Arab governments adopted an intense approach while Arab public opinion was 
positive, especially concerning its support for the resistance of Israel and its opposition to the United States. After 
2003, the official position, especially from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, continued to be 
negative, towards Iran, but it approached the Arab public opinion, particularly in light of Iran's strong attachment to 
the sectarian dimension in its foreign policy (James, 2013). 
 
4. The nature of the domestic political scene and the political militarization of Iran starting as of 1991, and increasing 
after 2005. It tended to link the Arab Spring to the Islamic revolution in Iran using the Islamic awakening movement. 
The approach was completely different and even against the desire of those demanding change, especially in Syria.  
However, Saudi Arabia's animosity with Iran increased after 2003 with Saudi concern over possible military 
developments in the nuclear program or Iran and international community tolerance in dealing with the Iranian nuclear 
file compared to the situation with Iraq, in line with the statements of the late Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-
Faisal in 2005 that the United States presented Iraq to Iran on a gold plate, which was evident in the growing Saudi 
concern (Hill, 2017). The Saudi-Iranian relations entered a real fall with rising President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to 
power. His term witnessed the dominance of the Revolutionary Guards on the political scene, and his policy aroused the 
ire of Riyadh. Moreover, the United States was seeking to coordinate with Iran's neighbours to curb the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, especially the nuclear program of Iran. However, it tended to weaken the Saudi role since 2003 despite 
the Saudi political and non-political support Washington has enjoyed for its policy in the region (Ehteshami, 2014). 
Position of Both Iran And Saudi Arabia Towards The Yemen Crisis 
The reality of the Yemeni crisis 
The Yemeni crisis is the result of numerous accumulations of policies adopted by previous governments, political power, 
and tribes alike. Other subjective and objective factors, in which the Yemeni internal affairs and abroad factors 
interacted, contributed to the development of this crisis and formed a framework for the current crisis. In particular, the 
exacerbation of the sectarian dimension could be depicted in the political conflict between the government and the 
opposition as well as among the opposition itself, specifically between the so-called "Houthis" and the Yemeni 
Congregation for Reform and its allied forces. The two sides worked directly as active members of the Yemeni People's 
Revolution, which began in 2011 and ousted former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, the current causes 
of the crisis can be traced back to 2011 when protests broke out calling for the ousting of former President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh. Such protests were covered with risks of the civil war because the regime tended to reject all popular demands 
and to use excessive violence against demonstrators (Lackner, 2019). 
Saudi Approach Towards the Yemeni crisis 
When Yemen witnessed months of mass revolt and protests in 2011 against the regime, Saudi Arabia supported its 
former ally, Ali Abdullah Saleh, before playing an important role in shaping a transitional political formula through the 
Gulf initiative under which Saleh gave up presidency. Prince Sultan had been in charge of the Yemeni file since the 
sixties of the last century and headed a special committee on the affairs of Yemen. Following his death, Saudi Arabia's 
policy towards Yemen was troubled due to the decline of its relations with Yemeni Congregation for Reform and al-
Ahmar Clan, Sheikhs of Hashid tribes, the largest Yemeni tribes. This was due to the development of the Saudi position 
on the Muslim Brotherhood file, especially in Egypt, which led to the interest of Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Saudi Arabia 
has faced the threat of Houthi expansion on its western and southern borders. Following the ascension of King Salman to 
the throne, calls for a review of Saudi Arabia’s policy in Yemen were raised. This led to waging war on Yemen, which is 
still on-going under the title “Operation Decisive Storm'' in 2019. Despite this intervention and war, the Iranian influence 
increased in Yemen through the Houthis’ control over most organs of the Yemeni state, which in turn posed a threat to 
Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region. Therefore, this threat required Saudi Arabia and GCC’s involvement to 
solve the Yemeni crisis, restore stability, and get rid of the Iranian influence in Yemen (Al- Muwadaa, 2015). 
Iran's Approach Towards the Yemeni crisis 
Iran has supported the Houthi group since its inception through charities and non-governmental organizations. 
According to Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and other reports, Iran has also invested in militarily and 
security aspects for the Houthis through training in Iran and Lebanon as well as launching a dedicated channel 
broadcasted from the southern suburb of Beirut (Juneau, 2016). 
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Some experts believe that Iran's main objective in Yemen is to be a soft state that Iran can use to curtail the role of Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf States. This will ensure a strategic influence on Bab-el-Mandeb. To achieve such purpose, Iranian 
support was not limited to the Houthis, but also Ali Salem al-Beidh, who calls for the secession of the south and owns 
Adan Live TV broadcasting from south Yemen (Al- Muwadaa, 2015). On the other hand, the nuclear agreement signed 
by Iran in mid-June 2015 with the 5+1 Group, permanent Security Council members and Germany, raised the Saudi 
Arabia’s concerns before the start of 2016, which opened to the impact of the conflict after Saudi Arabia executed the 
Shiite sheikh Saudi Nimr al-Nimr (Mamadkul, 2017). 
Pragmatism was manifested in the Saudi-Iranian conflict in Yemen through instability and chronic conflict between the 
two countries, which allowed Iran to expand in Yemen, Syria and South Lebanon as soft areas, according to the Iranian 
perspective, in which it could achieve its pragmatic interests. When Saudi Arabia adopted the same thought, Iran has 
made more regional gains. The features of strengthening Iran's role were also evident after the nuclear agreement with 
the G5 +1 in mid-2015, as it owns pragmatic, ideological, and military capabilities. Although this agreement limited 
Iran's nuclear ambitions, it supported its security and lifted sanctions enabling it to implement its pragmatic regional 
ambitions through new and anticipated resources (Farideh, 2015). Due to the sectarian and political differences between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially in the period following the execution of the Saudi Shiite Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr in 
January 2016 and Iranian interference in Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, a fundamental strategic understanding is likely 
ruled out, since the differences were deepened in the period 2016 to 2019 over Yemen. Saudi Arabia is unwilling to 
relinquish its leadership role in the US-led regional bloc, especially after the election of US President Donald Trump in 
2016. The United States mobilized all its capabilities against the Iranian tide in the region, which includes other 
countries such as Egypt and Jordan, within the framework of the US roadmap of the Middle East and the interests of the 
US and its allies (Hussein, 2017). 
On the other hand, in the face of Iranian expansion, Saudi Arabia has proceeded to consolidate its relationship, which 
was originally established on a pragmatic basis. Although Saudi-US relations are close, some suggest a decline 
especially after the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the headquarters of his country's consulate in Turkey, 
and the Saudi military operation in Yemen from 2015 to 2019. There are other reasons including geopolitical changes 
such as the emergence of China as a strong competitor to the United States as well as the significant decline in oil prices, 
which changed the situation in the Middle East upside down. Iran may converge with the United States while US 
pressures on Iran may have resulted in the economic inflation witnessed in Iran. Through the severe economic sanctions, 
Trump wishes to bankrupt the Iranian regime and reduce its prestige in the region and the world, primarily to serve 
Israel’s security. As a result, the United States used Iran to impose pressure on Saudi Arabia to obtain more Saudi 
investment funds and gains and achieve pragmatic interests by defending Saudi Arabia for money. This was evident 
during the period 2017-2019, after the inauguration of Trump. This pragmatic approach continues to this day. 
RESULTS 
Continuation of the Iran-Saudi conflict does not benefit both countries because it will lead to further destruction of 
Yemen and disturbances in the region. The Houthis' continued control over organs of the state, the intensification of the 
armed conflict, and the widening cycle of violence may push the situation in Yemen to further destruction and 
disturbances in the region. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry in Yemen led to open political-economic-military conflict, the 
collapse of state institutions, and domination of chaos, which led to the current civil war. Continuation of conflict 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran worked as an incubator and a fertile environment for increasing the influence of new 
forces in the country such as Ansar Allah and Al Qaeda. The Saudi-Yemeni rivalry led to separation and division of 
some areas of Yemen on regional or sectarian bases, especially Saada in the north and Aden in the south. The poor 
Saudi-Iranian relations led to the Houthis' insistence on imposing their control over the state by force, refusal to respect 
the authority of sovereign institutions, and denial to return to the democratic path, which negatively affected Yemen. The 
pragmatism was manifested in the periods of political calmness and stability between Saudi Arabia and Iran to further 
revive the economic and cultural relations between both countries. In brief, The Houthi rebellion and their rapid 
expansion to the south have caused Saudi concern because they considered this to be an indication of the escalation of 
Iranian and Houthi targets simultaneously. Thus, instead of Saudi Arabia views the Houthis as a tolerable force in the 
north, it considered them as a major threat to its interests, so it rushed to work by forming an Arab-international alliance 
that seeks to restore Yemen, and with it regain its influence in the Gulf region. The support of the countries allied with it, 
led by Egypt and Pakistan, in addition to the support of Western countries such as the United States and France, for the 
military campaign led by Saudi Arabia, to greatly enhance the position of Riyadh, especially since Iran is engaged in 
more important issues, particularly the nuclear file and the Syrian crisis, and therefore It can retract the Houthis if it 
concludes that their situation is weak, especially as Iran's relationship with the Houthis is more pragmatic than 
ideological. 
CONCLUSION 
Iran is a vital country in the Middle East, a geographic and historical neighbour with a significant strategic position. 
Neither country in the region can eliminate the other. The main problem between Iran and Saudi Arabia is pragmatic 
rather than sectarian due to Iran's tendency towards expansion and domination. Obviously, -power supremacy entices all 
forces in loose areas and weak countries. Iran’s approach and role could have happened through other parties such as 
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Turkey that also has an ambition of expansion in the region. However, it seeks to achieve such objective through 
understanding and dialogue with countries of the region. It is noteworthy that the issue of Iran as considered by the Gulf 
States, especially Saudi Arabia, is trying to achieve its influence in the region by threatening to use the logic of force. 
Means of understanding are not adopted in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. However, the problem in dealing with the Iranian 
project has two dimensions: firstly: the national dimension in the historical context i.e. revolutionary nature, in which the 
Safavid dimension and sectarian difference are highlighted. Secondly: the sectarian dimension, which is strongly present 
in the Iranian pragmatic policy. Its relations and alliances are inclined in this direction. In dealing with Iran, it is not 
required to abolish it or deal with it as an enemy. It is only needed to deter Iran to deal with Saudi Arabia and other 
countries in the region as a neighbour country not based on an approach of domination. Eventually, its pragmatic 
approach will result in understanding and regulating relations with its neighbours. 
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD 
This current study is mainly focused on the pragmatism in Saudi-Iranian relationships and its impact on the Yemeni 
crisis, specifically in the period (2011-2019). This study can be replicated to ascertain an investigation of the impact of 
the pragmatism of Saudi-Iranian relationships in the Middle East region. The year (2011) was set as the starting point of 
the study and the year (2019) as the end of the study to monitor the latest updates on the international, regional and 
political relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in light of the international circumstances and changes. The reason for 
choosing (2011) as the beginning of the study is the events of the Arab Spring that emerged at the opening of this year 
and spread to most Arab countries including Yemen. The researcher chose (2019) because it enables him to obtain and 
benefit from available information, facts, data, and documents concerning the developments of the Yemeni crisis, 
especially following Operation Decisive Storm led by Saudi Arabia, which marked the end of the study. Another 
limitation of this study is that it is primarily conducted to examine the pragmatism in Saudi-Iranian relationships, but 
future studies might be able to replicate this research in more diverse on the impact of Saudi-Iranian relationships on 
Middle East countries. In brief, conducting further studies on Saudi-Iranian relations, as this would benefit the study. 
Conduct more in-depth studies on the Yemeni issue by narrowing the negative gap between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Also, 
study the unified security strategy of the Arab countries, especially; Yemen. Finally, reconsider the foreign policy of 
both countries and recognizing that the tension between them will lead to further interventions by the great countries, 
especially the United States that only cares for protecting its strategic interests.  
REFERENCES 
1. Adel, N. A.-N. (2011). Impact of the Political System on the Decision Making Process in Iran (1997-2015). 
Arab East Center for Strategic and Civilizational Studies, 5(11).  
2. Al- Muwadaa, A. (2015). Yemeni Crisis: Where to. Amman: Center for Middle Eastern Studies. 
3. Al-Hamad, J. (2016). Saudi-Iranian Relations. Amman, Jordan: Center for Middle Eastern Studies  
4. Al-Hamdani, Q. (2004). Basics of Political Science. Amman: Majdalawi Publishing and Distribution House. 
5. Al-Khawaldeh, M. (2014). Decision-Making Approach in the Syrian Crisis. Amman, Jordan: Center for Middle 
Eastern Studies. 
6. Al-Khobar, H. (2019). Saudi-Iranian Relations Retreat after Advance. Retrieved from http://www.theg 
uardian.com/world/2015/mar/13/Irans-advancess-creato-alarm-in-saudi-arabia-and-the-gulf-13/march/2015 
7. Al-Menoufi, K. (1987). Origins of Comparative Political Systems (1 ed.). Kuwait: Al-Rubaiaan Company for 
Publication and Distribution. 
8. Asadi, B. (2002). Iran and Gulf Security. Beirut: Middle East Affairs Magazine. 
9. Clausen, M.-L. (2015). Understanding the crisis in Yemen: Evaluating competing narratives. The International 
Spectator, 50(3), 16-29. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1053707 
10. Commins, D. (2010). Saudi Arabia, Southern Arabia, and the Gulf States from the First World War.  
11. Ditto, S. (2013). Reading Rouhani: the promise and peril of Iran's new president: Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy. 
12. Easton, D. (1977). A system analysis of political life. Politička Misao, 14(01), 104-117.  
13. Ehteshami, A. (2014). Middle East Middle Powers: Regional Role, International Impact. Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Dergisi, 11(42), 29-49. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.553296 
14. Esfandiary, D., & Tabatabai, A. (2015). Iran's ISIS policy. International Affairs, 91(1), 1-15. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12183 
15. Farideh, F. (2015). The middle east after the Nuclear Deal. Council on Foreign Relation. 
16. Hasan, H. (2019). A Brief Overview of Turkish-Iranian Relations. Retrieved from https://iramcenter. 
org/en/home/:  
17. Hill, G. (2017). Yemen endures civil war, Saudi adventurism, and the future of Arabia: Oxford University 
Press. 
18. Hussein, M. (2017). Saudi-Iranian Relations: Breaking Ice or Attempts to Soften. Retrieved from 
www.m.dw.com 
19. James, Z. (2013). The Rise and Fall of Fran in Arab and Muslim public opinion. Retrieved from www.Huffing 
20. Jibril, A. (2015). Prosp Prospects of Saudi Foreign Policy under King Salman bin Abdulaziz. Retrieved from 
https://www.cmes.lu.se/research/:  
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 8, No 2, 2020, pp 781-790 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8287 
790 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                                    © Alarqan 
21. Juneau, T. (2016). Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment. 
International Affairs, 92(3), 647-663. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12599 
22. Kazemi, I. (2001). The course of Iranian-Saudi Relations: Middle East Affairs Magazine. 
23. Lackner, H. (2019). Yemen in Crisis: Road to War: Verso Books. 
24. Mamadkul, J. (2017). Saudi Arabia–Iran’s foreign policy crisis: A case study of execution of Saudi Shia Cleric 
Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Rangsit Journal of Social Science Humanities, 4(1), 75-82.  
25. Melhem, A. (2016). Saudi-Iranian Relations More than (60) Years of Tension. Retrieved from www.orient-
news8/9/2016/15:12 
26. Nawfal, A. (2016). Yemen and Iraq Crises. Retrieved from https://www.cmes.lu.se/research/:  
27. Pound, E. T., & Jack, J. (2004). The Iran Connection. US News World Report, 34-48.  
28. Rajayiy, A. (2012). Iran's Strategic on the Arab National Security in the Middle East (Master Thesis), Middle 
East University, Middle East University. Retrieved from https://meu.edu.jo/libraryThes 
es/586a06c5d00e3_1.pdf 
29. Saleem, E.-S. (1994). Interaction within an Institutional Intellectual Framework Triangle. Seminar on Equal 
Tripartite Dialogue between the Arabs, Iran, and Turkey, September 1994(33), 1-20.  
30. Wakim, J. (2011). Great Powers Conflict in Syria and the Geopolitical Dimensions of the 2011 Crisis. Beirut: 
Publications Company for Distribution and Publishing. 
 
